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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

;)

Plaintiff and Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

]

vs.

)
|
)

JEFFREY HOUSTON,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 20050535-CA

)

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
This is an appeal of a jury trial and conviction in the district court without jurisdiction
having deprived the accused, Mr. Houston, of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In this
matter, the trial judge on the day of trial, forced Defendant to represent himself, without either
the benefit of counsel or a knowing intelligent waiver of assistance of counsel. Under the
circumstances surrounding the trial, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused, the Court could not have legitimately found a waiver. In this matter, the court failed to
consider all of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Houston's situation and did not make proper
findings sufficient to find a proper intelligent waiver had been made. Given the fact that Mr.
Houston only had from January 4, 2005 to January 26, 2005 to find counsel for a two-day trial on

seventeen second degree felony counts is a daunting task for anyone, let alone Mr. Houston
would could not afford counsel, and he worked graveyards in a new job.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953, as amended)
(2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony). Mr. Houston appeals the final order and judgment of the Seventh
Judicial District Court, in and for Emery County of thirteen counts convicting him Possession of
a Drug Precursor-crystal iodine for one incident on December 30, 2002 wherein he was involved
in a lawful over-the-counter transaction with an animal clinic as a farrier. The other twelve
convictions were inferences taken from the State's Exhibit " 1 , " a transaction history depicting a
history of prior transactions.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES.
(1)

Whether Defendant was deprived his Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel at the time of his jury trial?
(2)

Whether the trial court lost jurisdiction 'in the course of the proceedings' due to

the judge's failure to complete the court - as the Sixth Amendment requires - by providing
counsel for an accused who was unable to obtain counsel, who had not intelligently waived this
constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty was at stake?
(3)

Whether Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the assistance of counsel

in this matter?
2

(4)

Whether the trial court indulged every reasonable presumption against Defendant

waiving his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and whether the court ignored the presumption
against the relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege?
(5)

Whether Defendant was deprived a fair trial?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW.
The standards of review in this matter has long since been established and was reiterated
by this Court:
"'Constitutional issues . . . are questions of law which we [also] review for correctness.'"
In re B. K, 33 P.3d 1083 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). (citations omitted).
"A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and law,
which we review de novo." "Moreover, we review a district court's factual findings
based on live testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing only for clear error."
United States v. Holder. 410 f.3d 651, 654 (10th Cir. 2005); Romero v. Tansy, 46 F.3d 1024,
1028 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-l 1(2) (2002)

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-3(12)(k) (2002)

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-19 (2002)

U.S. Const., 4th Amend.

U.S. Const., 6th Amend.

U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amend.

STATEMENTS OF THE CASE.
I.

Nature of the Case:
This case arises from an illegally conducted jury trial. The court's jurisdiction at the trial
3

was lost 'in the course of the proceedings' due to failure to complete the court - as the Sixth
Amendment requires - by providing counsel for an accused who was clearly unable to obtain
counsel, who had not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty
was at stake. T-l, at 8.1 The trial by jury was conducted on January 26-28, 2005 on thirteen
counts of Controlled Substance Precursor Act in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-l 1(2) and
§ 58-37c-3(12)(k) for having purchased one pound of crystal iodine from a veterinarian animal
clinic on December 30, 2002. T-l, at 50.
II.

Course of the Proceedings:
This matter commenced on January 6, 2003 by the filing of an Information alleging one

count Controlled Substance Precursor Act in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-l 1(2) and §
58-37c-3(12)(k) for having purchasing crystal iodine from a veterinarian animal clinic for an
alleged purchase on December 30, 2002. R. at 1, 72. The filing was done despite the knowledge
that Houston was a reported farrier. T-l, at 67; T-2, at 11; R. at 447.
The court held an initial appearance hearing on January 7, 2003. At that time a copy of
the Information was provided to the Defendant, he was advised of his charges on the record, and
was advised of the right to counsel. In response, the Defendant indicated to the court that he
would hire his own attorney. R. at 3.
No preliminary hearing is held or was held in this case. Although, one was scheduled
originally for February 4, 2003 at the initial appearance hearing. R. at 4-6. It would be
scheduled and rescheduled to the following dates: 2/04/2003, 4/01/2003, 5/06/2003, 6/03/2003,

1

Citations to the record concerning trial transcripts will be "T" for transcript followed by
a number indicating which volume followed by the coronating page. (E.g. "T-l" means Transcript
volume one.
4

12/02/2003. R. at 11, R. at. 17, R. at 40, R. at 146.
Defendant hired Margret Sidwell Taylor, a local defense attorney from Helper, Utah to
represent him in this matter. Ms. Taylor entered her appearance on February 3, 2003. R. at 12.
The April 1, 2003 preliminary hearing was vacated due to Ms. Taylor's attendance at a funeral
out of town. R. at 17.
On May 5, 2003, the County Attorney filed an Amended Information charging the
Defendant with seventeen counts of Controlled Substance Precursor Act in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37c-l 1(2) and § 58-37c-3(12)(k) for having purchased crystal iodine from the
veterinarian animal clinic as shown from a transaction history printout spanning the entire time
Defendant had previously purchased crystal iodine in his history. R. at 27-31. Apparently a copy
was not provided to Defendant nor counsel because the record is devoid of independent
certification of delivery.2 Following May 5th, being informed that an Amended Information
would be filed, on May 5, 2003, the same date, Margret Taylor moved to vacate the preliminary
hearing for May 6, 2003. R. at 22. Subsequently he next day Ms. Taylor failed to appear to the
May 6, 2003 preliminary hearing for rescheduling for the next day, May 7, 2003, the county
attorney mailed notice of the new date of June 3, 2003 to her. R. at 40.
On June 3, 2003, Margret Taylor filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of vagueness.
Ms. Taylor's motion rambles on dissecting the Precursor Act comparing the criminal conduct to
culinary arts class spouting rhetoric such as "If this were this a culinary arts class, and the
assignment was to make a "substance" the experiment would produce as many "substances" as

2

Moreover, page 32 of the record is not a certificate of mailing for the Amended
Information.
5

cooks. The possibilities are infinite!" "The information and the statute from which it is taken,
fails to tell the cook [apparently referring to meth cooks, which was not Defendant's charge] the
specific recipe and the necessary ingredients to make the substance that will be forbidden." R. at
48. "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." R. at 56.
On June 11, 2003, the county attorney responded to the motion to dismiss. Oral
arguments was set to be heard by the Court on July 1, 2003, however, Margret Taylor moved to
vacate the hearing on June 30, 2003 based on her receiving a copy of the Supreme Court of the
United States decision "Lawrence v. Taylor." R. at 64. She asserted that somehow that the
Lawrence case held some significance to Defendant's case and requested additional time to
review, analyze and incorporate the principles. Id. On that same date, June 30, 2003, the county
objected pointing out successfully that the two matters had nothing in common. "The Lawrence
case involved the constitutionality of a statute banning sodomy between consenting adults. This
case involves the buying and distribution of crystal iodine to be used in the production of
methamphetamine. No privacy interests involved." R. at 66.
The continuance was denied and on the next date, July 1, 2003, the court heard oral
arguments. R. at 68. On July 3, 2003, the parties stipulated to facts concerning the motion at
hand for the conduct of December 30, 2002 for which Defendant was arrested on. R. at 72. On
July 21, 2003, Ms. Taylor filed a reply memorandum including and espousing more rhetoric (i.e.
"Liberties Lost In The War On Drugs," "Control vs. Liberty"). R. at 76, 80, 83. Margret Taylor
then moved to allow the supplementation of her memoranda on August 27, 2003, which included
citation references to "Lockner v. New York, 1905, the police power vs the rights of citizens"
and "Marbury v. Madison" both without citations to their appropriate reporters, nor citations to
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their volume or pages-failing altogether to follow well-established basic blue book instructions.
R. at 100. Despite the inferior efforts, the Court granted the request on August 28, 2003. R. at
104. On August 29, 2003, Margret Taylor filed her supplemental memorandum. In her
supplemental memorandum, Ms. Taylor argued that the police powers exercised by the
Legislature was exceeded when "it enacted the Controlled Substance Act as it concerns
precursors because it is "unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interferences into the rights
[of] the individual to possess and distribute certain substances which the State deems to be
"controlled." Her personal philosophy is stated clear that the State in enacting these "possession
and distribution laws" against the possession of drugs is unreasonable, unnecessary and a
personal violation of a persons right to pursue happiness. R. at 107-121. Citing to "Lawrence v.
Texas, 02-102 (U.S. (6/26/2001", she quotes:
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court and began the opinion with these
words:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a
dwelling or other private places. In our tradition, the State is not omnipresent in
the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and existence, outside the
home, where the State should not be a dominant presences. Freedom extends
beyond spatial bonds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression and certain intimate conduct. The instant
case involves liberty of the person both ibn its spatial and more transcendent
dimensions.
The Supreme Court held petitioners were free as adults to engage in private
conduct in the exercise of their liberty via the Due Process Caluse of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Lawrence Court cites Griswoldv. Connecticut, 262 U.S. 479 (1965.
Griswold invalidated a state law prohibiting th use of drugs for contraceptives,
and established the right of an individual to a "right to privacy" in the marital
bedroom.
R. at 118. Ms. Taylor's intent is to seek the condoning of the use and possession of drugs as a
7

liberty interest or in other words to the legalization of drugs through judicial activism, which
would require a series of judicial rulings finding the conduct unconstitutional rather than through
the Legislature or public referenda, apparently abandoning the prior vagueness argument. It must
have been Ms. Taylor's agenda to seek a ruling from the court that possession of a controlled
substance is permissible if done in your own bedroom, which was not Mr. Houston's situation.
The county attorney responded on September 10, 2003. R. at 137. The ruled on November 18,
2003. Part of the court's ruling states "The legislature has made it illegal to possess certain
precursors if done with criminal intent. The court cannot find that the enactment of the Act by
the legislature violates the due process clause of the Constitution of the United State of the
Constitution of the State of Utah. The defendant has not presented any evidence to show that his
due process rights have been violated." R. at. 144.
On December 2, 2003, Margret Taylor waived the preliminary hearing and he was
arraigned on the seventeen counts of the amended information.3 All second degree felonies. R.
at 146. At that time, the court set a pretrial conference for February 3, 2004, and a two-day jury
trial is set for March 11-12, 2003. On January 22, 2004, the court vacated the jury trial for
March due to a "conflict in the Court's calendar." R. at 154. At the pretrial, Ms. Taylor did not
have Defendant appear, so the pretrial and jury trial was reset. The court scheduled another
pretrial on April 6, 2004 and the trial was set for April 26, 2004.
On April 5, 2004, Ms. Taylor filed a motion to suppress evidence. The basis for the
motion was "on the grounds and for the reasons that the Officer who stopped and detained

3

This statement contradicts Houston's trial representation that he did not waive his
preliminary hearing. T-l, at 8. ("I never waived my right. I never did. My attorney may have . .
8

[defendant] did not have the requisite probable cause to stop Defendant's vehicle, nor to search
defendant and the contents of his vehicle, or to interrogate him." R. at. 167. Ms. Taylor missed
the arguments that officers were exploitive and they failed to clarify his request to have a lawyer
present during the interview, when he asked for Mr. Langston to be present after being warned of
Miranda. R. at 429-444, 435-437.
At the April 6, 2004 pretrial conference, the court struck the trial dates and scheduled a
suppression hearing instead. A hearing was scheduled for April 26, 2004. On April 21, 2004,
Ms. Taylor motioned the court to vacate the hearing on the grounds that the county attorney had
failed to provide Ms. Taylor a copy of the defendant's tape-recorded interrogation. R. at 172.
An order vacating the hearing was entered on April 21, 2004. The hearing was rescheduled for
June 14, 2004. On June 10, 2004, Ms. Taylor moved to vacate the suppression hearing because
she was taking a "leave of absence from June 14 through July 11, 2004." R. at 184. On June 14,
2004, the hearing was vacated. The Suppression Hearing was rescheduled for July 27, 2004. R.
at 191,194. On July 26, 2004, Ms. Taylor requested that the hearing be vacated "for health
reasons" and asked the court for additional time so "Defendant can engage the services of
another attorney to conduct the suppression hearing." R. at 196. Also on July 26, 2004, the State
moved to deny the motion to suppress on two grounds, the age of the case and the because of the
"history of this case" outlining "the abuses being perpetuated by Defendant's counsel in this
case." The State claimed:
It has now been more than one-and-a-half years since this case was filed and more than
five years since the facts supporting the allegations in this case arose, yet we still do not
have a trial date. It is now apparent that counsel's tactic has been to delay this case from
proceeding time after time. If counsel believed there were legitimate suppression issues,
they could have been filed shortly after the case was filed, as is normal in all other cases.
Counsel should not be allowed to choose an issue, file motions, and then when that is
9

denied, move on to another issue ad infinitum. Cases could never come to trial, if such
were allowed.
R. at 201, 203.
Contrary to previous requests, the court declined to vacate the suppression hearing. Neither
defendant nor Ms. Taylor appeared. At the July 26, 2004 hearing, the court accepted Mr.
Langston's arguments and denied the motion to suppress finding it untimely. An order to show
cause was then scheduled against Ms, Taylor for her failure to appear for September 14, 2004
along with a pretrial conference. Also a new trial setting was scheduled for October 6, 2004. R.
at210-211.
Then on August 12, 2004, the State identified Jennifer McNair, of the Utah State Crime
Lab as an expert witness. R. at 214. Ms. McNair is a Criminalist often years for the State. On
August 16, 2004, Ms. Taylor moved to reset the suppression hearing. R. at 222. And the State
objected on August 20,2004. R. at 226. On September 14, 2004, the court conducted its
hearings wherein Ms. Taylor was questioned as to her illness. The court found, "Because
Defense Counsel had been ill, the Court will allow a Suppression Hearing to be held."
Afterwards the State advised the court that the motion to suppress was "insufficient" so the court
ordered Ms. Taylor to submit a "more specific Motion to Suppress" by September 16, 2004. R.
at. 232.
On September 16, 2004, Ms. Taylor requested an enlargement of time to submit the more
specific motion to suppress. She requested four days. R. at. 233. In stead of four days, she
received leave to file by the following morning at 9:00 a.m. of September 17th. R. at. 235. On
September 17, 2004, the State moved to vacate the motion to suppress. R. at 237. She never did
file a motion to suppress. In stead of a motion to suppress, on September 20, 2004, Ms. Taylor
10

filed a motion to sever count I. R. at 240, 255. Ms. Taylor argued that
Defendant would be prejudiced if he were required to stand trial on all seventeen (17)
counts against him at the same time for the following reasons:
All during the time of the arrest and the interrogation of Defendant for more than three
(3) hours, Defendant was led to believe that he would be charged with one count, a third
degree felony. At no time was Defendant made aware of the other sixteen (16) charges
still pending. Not until the Amended Information was filed did Defendant learn he was
charged with an additional sixteen (16) counts.
R. at 242.
Later that day, September 20, 2004, the suppression hearing for September 22, 2004 was
vacated and the trial date of October 6, 2004 was confirmed. R. at 244, 249. On Spetember22,
2004, the Defense then moved to compel discovery concerning the names and ranks of officers
present during the interrogation. R. at 252. Based upon the filing of the motion to sever, the
court scheduled a hearing on the matter for October 1, 2004. R. at 258. On September 20, 2004,
the State objected to the motion to sever claiming common scheme. R. at 261. Then without
explanation on September 30, 2004, Ms. Taylor withdrew the motion to sever. R. at 265.
On the day of trial, October 6, 2004, the trial was cancelled in light of the judge having a
"medical emergency"4 and so the trial was vacated. R. at 267-268. On October 14, 2004, the
trial was reset for November 18, 2004. R. at 270. On November 18, 2004, a hearing convened.
The record reflected that "Counsel contacted the court yesterday afternoon and indicated they had
reached a plea agreement." At that hearing, the Court inquired of defendant's counsel and
defendant if that was their intent. Each of them addressed the Court. The Court found the
defendant was not prepared to enter a plea at that time. Ms. Taylor then made a motion to

4

At trial, the judge later explained he had a kidney stone. T-l, at 8.
li

withdraw as counsel and the motion was granted because "there appears to be a conflict between
the defendant and his counsel" so the court found. R. at 280.
Based there upon, the Court reset the jury trial to convene on January 26-27, 2005 and set
the matter for further proceedings on December 7, 2004. R. at 280-281. The court did not
inquire as to appointment of counsel at that time. The notice of the hearing was mailed by the
clerk of the court, however, Mr. Houston never received it and the notice was returned to the
court "moved left no address" clearly marked by the USPS R. at 284. On December 7, 2004, an
appearance of counsel was faxed, received by the court indicating that Mr. Oliver was being
retained by Mr. Houston to represent him. R. at 286, 292.
The minutes for the December 7, 2004, hearing revealed that the court acknowledged the
employ of attorney Bruce Oliver, confirmed the trial setting of January 26-27, 2005 and set a
pretrial settlement conference for January 4, 2005. R. at 289. But then by December 16, 2004,
Attorney Bruce Oliver subsequently filed a notice of withdrawal informing the court that the
appearance was prematurely entered pending client confirmation and retainer execution and that
after several attempts, Counsel has not been able to sustain communications with the Defendant
since December 7, 2004. R. at 300.
On December 21, 2004, a hearing was held on Bruce Oliver's motion to withdraw,
Defendant did not appear as the minutes reflect that Defendant was unable to be found to receive
service of the notice to today's hearing. Nevertheless, the court confirmed the January 4, 2005
pretrial conference. R. at 302-303, 304, 305.
Subsequently, on December 23, 2004, the court sent notice to Defendant informing him
of the January 4, 2005, pretrial conference. R. at 308. That notice was personally served by

12

constable on December 28, 2004. R. at 307.
At the January 4, 2005, pretrial conference, the court informed Mr. Houston that his
counsel had withdrawn due to his failure to remain in contact with Mr. Oliver. The court also
found that due to full-time employment Mr. Houston did not qualify for a public defender. Mr.
Houston made a motion to continue the trial set for January 26-27, 2005 so that he could find
counsel, and the court denied it urging him "to do whatever it takes to secure counsel for
himself." R. at 310.
Thereafter, on January 13, 2005, the court issued an order to appear for Defendant to
"advise the Court of his progress in hiring an attorney." R. at 321. On January 19, 2005, the
court conducted an attorney status hearing. In that hearing, Mr. Houston informed the court that
he had not retained another attorney as of yet. The Court found that Mr. Houston "has had ample
time to hire counsel." R. at 320.
On January 24, 2005, the State filed Proposed Jury Instructions R. at 323. On that same
date, the State also filed a new Second Amended Information, cutting the number of counts down
from seventeen to that of thirteen. R. at 327-330. Neither the instructions nor the amended
information was mailed or faxed to Mr. Houston. He first received a copy at the trial. T-l, at 11.
On January 24, 2005 at 23:27 hours the Defendant faxed in an Affidavit of Indigency. R.
at 344-346. On the first day of trial, the Court addressed the affidavit of indigency with Mr.
Houston who appeared without counsel and made findings. R. at 336; T-l, at 6-7. As part of his
findings, the judge ruled that "your filing of this document at that late hour is untimely, so I'm
not even going to consider it. The reason being is that that was not given to the court time to
appoint counsel and, ah, have counsel on board, ah, prior to the time that the trial began. So the

13

he affidavit that you filed, even though it's not completed and even though under that you
otherwise may have qualified for an attorney, is untimely. Filed essentially one day before the
trial. The court went on to make additional findings concerning the case history, which included
that the case was filed on January 6, 2003, and that he hired an attorney Margret Taylor on
February 7, 2003. Then the court drew emphasis to all of Ms. Taylor's failures including the
waiver of a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2003. Mr. Houston informed the court that he
did not waive his right to a preliminary hearing. T-1, at 8. None of that conduct was directly Mr.
Houston's fault.
The court also found that Mr. Houston had not completed filling out the affidavit. T-l, at
8. Mr. Houston explained that he had overlooked that section. Id.
In its findings, the Court clarified the cancellation of the October 6, 2004 trial was due to
the judge having a kidney stone. At that time, had trial gone forward, Defendant was represented
by counsel at that time.
The judge also included in its findings that the November 18, 2004 trial was cancelled
because an alleged plea agreement had been reached. That next day, the court cancelled trial in
order to accept a plea when no deal was entered, the court permitted Margret Taylor to withdraw
despite being Defendant's hired, retained counsel for nearly two years. The court mentioned uder
the circumstances that gave Mr. Houston "more than two months within which to obtain
counsel."5

5

It is noteworthy the prejudice caused by the withdrawal at such a late hour in the
proceedings. Mr. Houston employed Margret Taylor in February 2003, at that time the charge was
one count, a second degree felony. At that time of her withdrawal without good cause, the defendant
needed to retain an attorney to represent him on seventeen counts all due to the decisions of Margret
Taylor for fighting her own agenda..
14

The court claimed it had ordered Mr. Houston to appear on December 7, 2004. The court
found that Mr. Houston appeared informing the court he had retained Bruce Oliver and that Mr.
Oliver later withdrew because Mr. Houston had not maintained contact with counsel. The court
did not refuse Mr. Oliver's withdrawal.
The Court also explained the following two hearings, to wit:
At the pretrial, on January the 4th, 2005, the Court questioned the defendant, as to his
hiring counsel. The Court, at that time, found that the defendant was employed full-time
and suggested on the record that the defendant did not qualify for a Public Defender. But
then again, on January 13th of 2005, the Court once again ordered the defendant to appealr
on January 19th of 2005 to review his counsel status. Ohn January 19th the defendant
appeared and the Court advised the defendant that he could file an affidavit of indigency,
but that it would have to be done immediately. And then, one day before trial, the
defendant filed an affidavit. But once again, the affidavit was not complete. And the
Court finds that finding it one day - filing it one day before trial in untimely.
So on that basis then the Court find that the defendant has had ample time to employ
counsel, ah, that he had ample opportunity to submit an affidavit, ah, requesting that
counsel be appointed, if he could not appoint counsel, and the Court just has no other
option but to go ahead with the trial - count - or with the trial at this time.
T-1, at 11.
Having concluded that trial would go forward as scheduled, the court then addressed the
issues of the new Second Amended Information which apprized defendant for the first time of
that a different information was being relied on a trial than previously submitted. The new
information dropped four counts due to the dates and because three purchases were for iodine
solution and not iodine crystals. T-1, at 12-13. The trial then proceeded against Mr. Houston,
who was present without counsel, and commenced informing Mr. Houston of procedures telling
Mr. Houston "because you are not represented by counsel at your trial." T-1, at 14. The first
instructions were the jury selection process. T-1, at 14-15. The court then instructed him about
Mr. Houston choosing to testify. T-1, at 16. The instructions included that he would be playing
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two roles, attorney asking questions and witness answering them. Id. Mr. Houston remarked
afterwards, that everything prior to that day was planned or scheduled through Margret Taylor
and that he hadn't been "able to get a hold of anyone or talk to anyone" referring to his own
witnesses. Mr. Houston then requested a continuance of the trial and it too was denied. T-l, 1718.
After jury selection, Mr. Langston then addressed the jury with opening statements, T-l,
at 33, followed by Mr. Houston's opening statements. Mr. Houston's statements however
consisted of testimony, T-l, at 41, much to his detriment.
The State then called its first witness, Jennifer McNair. T-l, at 42. Ms. McNair testified
that she was a Criminalist for the State Crime Lab and was employed there for 10 years. Her
degree was a Bachelor's of Science degree in chemistry. During her employ she had analyzed in
excess of 15,000 samples of suspected controlled substances. T-l, at 42.
McNair then testified concerning clandestine labs. The testimony as other crimes wrongs
or acts was extremely prejudicial and irrelevant as to the facts known in this case. McNair spoke
of hidden locations, and that one pound of crystal iodine could prepare approximately 422 grams,
or about .93 pounds of methamphetamine. T-l, 43-45. This too was speculation. Mr. Houston
was not charged with manufacturing methamphetamine or with operating a clandestine lab.
Potentially this was all grounds for mistrial.
During the testimony, Ms. McNair admitted she was not the one who analyzed the
sample submitted to the Crime Lab concerning Mr. Houston's case. When asked that particular
question she stated:
Q. And, ah, would you tell the jury who analyzed it.
A. Ah, Kevin Smith, a Senior Criminalist with the State Crime Lab.
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Q. Okay, And were you also, ah - did you have occasion to examine that, as well,
yourself?
A. I did not. I reviewed his work in this case.
T-l,at45.
The defendant did not object to the testimony as he should have if properly trained and
experienced. Other witnesses testified, including the arresting officers, and employees from the
Emery Animal Clinic. See T-l and T-2.
Then on January 28, 2005, after the trial concluded, the Court found Mr. Houston
indigent and appointed counsel, David Allred to appear on Mr. Houston's behalf at the time of
sentencing. R. at 344-348.
III.

Disposition in Trial Court:
After two days of trial, on the third day-January 28, 2005, the jury convicted the

Defendant on all 13 counts of the Second Amended Information.
IV.

Statements of Fact;
Detective Gregory Funk attended a DEA sponsored training session at Las Cruces. Part

of the scheduled curriculum included information about persons falsely holding themselves as
farriers and purchasing crystal iodine from veterinarians and using the crystal iodine for the
manufacturing of methamphetamine in clandestine labs. T-l, at 62. Upon his return he called
the Emery Animal Clinic to inquiry whether person fitting the profile may have been involved in
this type of activity. The clinic stated they would keep him informed.
Det. Funk testified that he received a call from the Emery Animal Clinic that Mr. Houston
was just about to purchase some crystal iodine and so he responded to witness. He followed Mr.
Houston outside the clinic to see if he could observe a bottle but admitted to the jury he couldn't.
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T-l, at 65. He returned inside and spoke with an employee of the clinic, Colleen Davis, who
informed the officer that Mr. Houston did indeed just leave after purchasing some crystal iodine.
She admitted being familiar with Mr. Houston for a couple of years. T-l, at 49. During that
period of time she introduced evidence indicating that Mr. Houston had purchased iodine
solution and crystal iodine from the clinic during the past couple of years preceding his arrest,
admitting uncertainty that others might have been present instead of Houston for former
transactions. T-l, at 53, 55. She admitted that the crystal iodine was sold to him as a farrier for
horses. Id. Mr. Houston is a licensed farrier. T-II, at 11.
Upon receiving this information, Det. Funk then radioed to Sgt. Jensen to initiate a traffic
stop. Id. Sgt. Jensen made contact with Mr. Houston initiating a traffic stop. Upon contact,
Sgt. Jensen interviewed Mr. Houston. When Det. Funk arrived, Funk took Houston to the back
of the vehicle and began talking with him. Det. Funk testified that Houston was not under arrest
at that time. He asked where Mr. Houston worked, and was informed that he worked for DNW
Trucking and that he was also a farrier. T-l, at 67.
Then Sgt. Jensen produced a bottle of crystal iodine because while Mr. Houston was
speaking with Det. Funk, Sgt. Jensen was searching Houston's vehicle. T-l, at 67. Upon
verification, Det. Funk confronted Houston informing him that he'd received information that
Houston was obtaining iodine for the manufacture of methamphetamine. T-l, at 67. Mr.
Houston did not respond. Regardless, he was placed under immediate arrest. T-l, at 67. The
one pound bottle of crystal iodine was placed in evidence. T-l, at 68. Houston was then
transported for custodial interrogation. T-l, at 69-70. That interview was transcribed. R. at 446505. Following Miranda warning, during the interview the county attorney Brent Langston was
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present at Mr. Houston's request R. at 481, 484. Mr. Langston is an lawyer. "With - why I
wanted him in here is - is that I kind of - 1 kind of need to know my position - where I sit before
I incriminate myself any further." At first, Mr. Houston was advised of his Miranda Rights,
which in part included the right to talk to a lawyer. R. at 446. With Miranda in mind, defendant
consented to the interview. As part of the interview he informed officers again that he was a
farrier and maintained it for nearly an hour. R. at 447. After Mr. Langston was brought into the
room, Mr. Langston offered leniency for Houston "coming clean with me" informing Houston he
is faced with a second-degree felony. He is then suggested possible drug court. R. at 484. And
Langston added, "Let me tell you this: I've been a prosecutor for sixteen years. I've seen pretty
much [everything.]" I have a reputation for being fair. If you want to know the specifics of what
I can do, I don't know, because I don't know what you have to offer, so I can't make you a
promise - you know, promise you the minimum without knowing what there is there. What I can
promise you is that I will be fair with you. And the big thing that you need to look at is there is a
big distinction between felony and misdemeanor. If I'm satisfied that you're coming clean with
me, we can go the route that's not going to make you a convicted felon for the rest of your life."
With the promise to be fair implying a misdemeanor conviction instead of a felony, Mr. Houston
confessed. R. at 496.
I purchase it from the vet, okay - the Animal Hospital - Emery Animal Hospital - Okay?
I purchase it. I do keep hall of it in my possession 905 of the time. Occasionally, they'll this guy - and this hasn't happened several times. It's been more recent. Um,
occasionally he'll - he wants more. I will - 1 give him that. He pays for it. Like I told
you out there, I've been struggling with my situation and everything else for - that's why
my truck wasn't re-licensed. You know, two months, I didn't realize it until last week,
but, um, as far as money goes, I just started the job two month ago - a month-and-a-half
ago; somewhere right in there. . . . The guy that has me get it [name omitted by
prosecutor], I take it to him. He trades me for - or gives me cash - whichever one I want.
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R. at 497.
Sgt. Jensen testified that he observed a valid basis to initial a traffic stop that being an
expired plate and that the vehicle's registration was revoked naming a Max Houston as the
owner. T-1, at 77. He initiated the traffic stop for the registration and because Pet. Funk had
requested it. T-1, at 78. Because of the revoked registration and the county's apparent policy to
impound, Sgt. Jensen then searched the vehicle finding the bottle of iodine in the passenger side
of the rear seat. T-1, at 79. The record is devoid of information concerning the return of Mr.
Houston's license and registration and Mr. Houston did not cross examine Sgt. Jensen in trial. T1, at 80.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

Issue One: No Probable Cause, Exploitation.
In this matter, the arresting officer, Det. Greg Funk, lacked reasonable articulable facts to
support an arrest of Mr. Houston and for the seizure of the one pound bottle of crystal iodine.
The stop, arrest and subsequent interview was exploited to obtain an apparent consensual
confession during custodial interrogations. The tactics applied in order to obtain seemingly
consensual voluntary information is violative of the Fourth Amendment pursuant to State v.
Ziegleman, 905 P.2d 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) and the Sixth Amendment pursuant to State v.
Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Following the arrest, Mr. Houston was interrogated for three hours. At the
commencement, Houston was Mirandized. Miranda required the accused to be informed he had
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the right to have a lawyer present during questioning. During the first hour, Mr. Houston
maintained that he was a farrier and the purchase of crystal iodine from the veterinarian hospital
was for horses he treated as a farrier. Then approximately an hour later, Mr. Houston requested
that Langston, the county attorney be brought in before he "further incriminated himself."
After Langston was apprized that Mr. Houston wanted to come clean, but wanted
Langston present, Mr. Houston right to having a lawyer present was not clarified in that he was
not informed that the right did not include the county attorney for bargaining purposes. During
the recorded interview, Mr. Langston offered Mr. Houston leniency if Mr. Houston did come
clean with them, that he would be fair with him including the possibility of drug court or
misdemeanor charges rather than second degree felony charges like a former accused they were
both aware of, Adam Wilson did. He informed Mr. Houston that Wilson went to prison and that
he did not want to send Houston to prison if he came clean. Having been made promises, Mr.
Houston confessed purchasing crystal iodine for another, John Paul Fazzio, believing it was
intended to be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.

Issue Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
The case was filed on January 6, 2003, contrary to promises the charge was filed as a
second degree felony. R. at 1. On February 7, 2003, Defendant retained the legal services of
Margret Taylor. R. at 12. The case was delayed by Taylor for nearly two years before she was
fmally withdrew as counsel on November 18, 2004, when Defendant refused to plea to a second
degree felony-the original single charge. The representation by Ms. Taylor was woefully
deficient and resulted in both needless delays of the proceeding and prejudice against Mr.
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Houston. Supra, During her representation, due to her lack of diligence and neglect, she did not
pursue matters timely, the motion to suppress was delayed and then abandoned without cause
even though grounds for a motion to suppress under Miranda and Ziegelman both appear
appropriate in light of officer exploitation. Ms. Taylor waived Defendant's preliminary hearing
without Mr. Houston's consent and without his knowledge. She filed a motion to sever and then
withdrew it without explanation. Finally on the day of trial, January 26, 2005, the court
attributed all of Ms Taylor's conduct onto Houston as part of his reason for denying the
appointment of counsel. Clearly, Taylor was ineffective as counsel. Rather than settling the
single second-degree felony charge to a misdemeanor as the discovery in the criminal case
revealed, the Defendant's counsel delayed the matter inappropriately while promoting her own
agenda seeking to legalize drug possession with judicial activism (as President Bush refers to as
legislating from the bench) polluting the case file with motions filled with rhetoric.

Issue Three: Sixth Amendment Violation.
In this matter, the record is clear that Defendant's court was not complete. The Supreme
Court revealed in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R.
357 (1938), a court's jurisdiction at the hearing of trial maybe lost "in the course of the
proceedings" due to failure to complete the court-as the Sixth Amendment requires-by providing
counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived this
constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. The judge forced the Defendant to
be tried without counsel. Its undisputed that two days later on January 28, 2005, the court found
Mr. Houston indigent for sentencing and had appointed counsel, David Allred because he
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couldn't afford an attorney. However, contrary to the Court's claim two days earlier at the
opening day of trial, Defendant did not waive the right to counsel. The did not address the factors
required by the courts. In stead, the court ruled it was untimely requested which is a woeful
departure and contrary to the law. It is well settled that upon the taking for evidence from the
State's first witness, after swearing a panel of jurors, jeopardy attaches. In this matter, a manifest
error resulted and the Defendant was deprived of a fair trial.

ARGUMENTS
POINT I. DEFENDANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED, AND WRONGFULLY
INTERROGATED; THE OFFICERS EXPLOITED THE CIRCUMSTANCES TO
FORCE A CONFESSION WHILE CLAIMING IT WAS CONSENSUAL.

Pursuant to Section 77-7-15 of the Utah Code, in order for the officer to perform a traffic
stop on Mr. Houston he must be possessed with reasonable articulable suspicion that a driver had
violated the law, or was about to. In this matter, Sgt. Jensen arguably observed Mr. Houston
operating a motor vehicle with a revoked registration and he executed a traffic stop after being
requested to by Det. Funk. T-l, at 77. Det. Funk wanted Houston stopped because he had
received information that moments earlier Houston had purchased a pound of crystal iodine from
the Emery Animal Clinic. T-l, at 49, 65. Operating of hunch alone that Houston's farrier history
with the Emery Animal Clinic was actually used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine, the
Defendant was arrested after a search of his vehicle yielded the one pound bottle of crystal iodine
from the rear passenger seat of the Defendant's vehicle. T-l, at 49, 67.

The search of the

vehicle was not pursuant to consent of the driver, it was an alleged inventory search. T-l, at 7879. The search was conducted pursuant to an inventory search because of the county's alleged
23

impound policy for vehicles with revoked registrations. T-l, at 79. Even though the bottle was
lawfully purchased, the bottle was seized and the defendant was arrested. T-l, at 67. It is lawful
to sale crystal iodine for licensed farriers. See, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37c-19 (2002). Mr.
Houston was familiar to the vet clinic personnel and they believed he was a farrier, having sold
him iodine for the previous two years as vet records indicated and as an employee, Colleen Davis
of the clinic testified. T-l, at 49. Mr. Houston testified at the time of trial that he was a licensed
farrier, schooled in the arts of shoeing and the crystal iodine was used as an antiseptic. T-l, at
67;T-2, a t l l ; R . at 447.
After being arrested, Mr. Houston was taken in for custodial interrogation by officers. T1, at 69-70. Sgt. Harrison and Det. Funk conducted the interrogation and later Brent Langston
the county attorney was present at Houston's request. R. at 481,484. The interview lasted nearly
three hours-starting at 19:23 hours and ending at 21:55 hours. R. at 446, 505. At the beginning,
Sgt. Harrison read Mr. Houston Miranda. R. at. 446. His Miranda included, "You have the right
to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you're being questioned." R. at 446.
Having being apprized of his rights, Mr. Houston agreed to speak with officers, stating, "Sure, I
don't have a problem . . . ." After clarifying that he understood they addressed the issue of
"buying excessive amount of iodine." Mr. Houston responded that he used it for shoeing
horses." He then offered examples of recent shoeing jobs, and continued in that fashion for an
hour or so. R. at 447. Subsequently, Mr. Houston felt compelled to request Mr. Langston be
brought in. The interview was transcribed. R. at 446-505. Pursuant to Houston's request, the
county attorney, Brent Langston invited in. R. at 481, 484. Mr. Langston is an lawyer. He
wanted to have a lawyer present before he confessed, stating, "With - why I wanted him in here
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is - is that I kind of - 1 kind of need to know my position - where I sit before I incriminate
myself any further." Because of being warned with Miranda, Mr. Houston reasonably believed
that Langston's presents is consistent with Miranda, which included the right to talk to a lawyer,
R. at 446, for the benefit of striking a deal. With Miranda in mind, it is undisputed that
defendant consented to the interview. However, it is debatable with police exploitation has
violated Mr. Houston's constitutional rights, whether Fourth Amendment or Sixth Amendment.
As part of the interview he informed officers that he was a farrier and maintained it for an hour.
After Mr. Langston was brought into the room, Mr. Langston offered leniency for Houston
"coming clean with me" informing Houston he was faced a second-degree felony. He then
suggested possible drug court. R. at 484. And Langston added, "Let me tell you this: I've been a
prosecutor for sixteen years. I've seen pretty much [everything.]" I have a reputation for being
fair. If you want to know the specifics of what I can do, I don't know, because I don't know what
you have to offer, so I can't make you a promise - you know, promise you the minimum without
knowing what there is there. What I can promise you is that I will be fair with you. And the big
thing that you need to look at is there is a big distinction between felony and misdemeanor. If
I'm satisfied that you're coming clean with me, we can go the route that's not going to make you
a convicted felon for the rest of your life. With that promise to be fair implying a misdemeanor
conviction instead of a felony, Mr. Houston confessed. R. at 496.
I purchase it from the vet, okay - the Animal Hospital - Emery Animal Hospital - Okay?
I purchase it. I do keep hall of it in my possession 905 of the time. Occasionally, they'll this guy - and this hasn't happened several times. It's been more recent. Um,
occasionally he'll - he wants more. I will - 1 give him that. He pays for it. Like I told
you out there, I've been struggling with my situation and everything else for - that's why
my truck wasn't re-licensed. You know, two months, I didn't realize it until last week,
but, um, as far as money goes, I just started the job two month ago - a month-and-a-half
ago; somewhere right in there... . The guy that has me get it [name omitted by
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prosecutor], I take it to him. He trades me for - or gives me cash - whichever one I want.
R. at 497.
This type of questioning was clearly exploitive and unlawful in light of State v.
Ziegleman, 905 P.2d 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) and State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991). In Ziegleman, this Court ruled that the defendant's consent to search although
voluntary in fact, it was obtained through the exploitation of prior illegal conduct. What
happened in Ziegleman, was that the defendant was pulled over for speeding. Before the officer
completed the purpose of the stop, the officer asked the defendant a battery of irrelevant
questions including whether any weapons were in the vehicle and whether there were any drugs
in the vehicle. After addressing these question, the officer ask for permission to look in the
vehicle. The defendant agreed saying, "Sure, go ahead." During the search, the officer founds
drags under the hood. Just as the Court in that matter concluded that the officer was exploitive in
Ziegleman, this Court should conclude that these Officers and Brent Langston were exploitive.
At hand, Mr. Houston consent to the interview of officers was in fact. However, similar to
Ziegleman situation, Houston consent was exploited. The only crime known to the officers at the
point of arrest was the alleged revoked registration. The officers only knew that he had just
lawfully purchased a one pound bottle of crystal iodine, they did not know his intent. Prior to the
interview, the only thing that officer were apprized by the Emery Animal Clinic was that he had a
history of purchasing large quantities. Not even they suspected that the purchases were
suspicious until officers informed them that crystal iodine could be used in the manufacturing of
methamphetamine. Nothing led the clinic into believing Mr. Houston was engaged in that
behavior considering he had a two year history with the clinic and had shown Colleen a rag with

26

burns on it. Farriers have used crystal iodine in the past as an antiseptic.
Mr. Houston's arrest was clearly without a warrant, or without probable cause. The only
thing that Det. Funk was apprized of was that Mr. Houston was in possession of crystal iodine
lawfully purchased over the counter and that he had the general reputation of being a farrier.
Upon Det. Funk's query concerning employment, Houston informed him, in part, he was a
farrier. Upon Sgt. Jensen's confirmation of a bottle in Houston's vehicle during the inventory
search, Det. Funk placed him into immediate arrest.
Subsequently during the interviews, the agents exploited the unlawful arrest to obtain a
confession from Houston through misleading him that he had a deal consummated by having a
lawyer present, the county attorney, during questioning. Once Mr. Langston promised to be fair
with Mr. Houston for coming clean, suggesting leniency a confession was obtained. Langston
suggested both drug court and reduction of a single second-degree felony to a misdemeanor
charge in order to get the confession. Following the promises, Houston confessed. R. at 496.
I purchase it from the vet, okay - the Animal Hospital - Emery Animal Hospital - Okay?
I purchase it. I do keep hall of it in my possession 905 of the time. Occasionally, they'll this guy - and this hasn't happened several times. It's been more recent. Um,
occasionally he'll - he wants more. I will - 1 give him that. He pays for it. Like I told
you out there, I've been struggling with my situation and everything else for - that's why
my truck wasn't re-licensed. You know, two months, I didn't realize it until last week,
but, um, as far as money goes, I just started the job two month ago - a month-and-a-half
ago; somewhere right in there. . . . The guy that has me get it [name omitted by
prosecutor], I take it to him. He trades me for - or gives me cash - whichever one I want.
R. at 497. Both the interview and the promises were exploitive in obtaining Houston's
confession. At the time of trial, the confession was used against Houston to obtain his conviction
on thirteen counts, all second-degree felonies. R. at 72. Notwithstanding, it is the confession
that lead to Houston's conviction on all thirteen counts and most likely would not have resulted
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in a conviction of one count, but for the confession and the agents exploitation of the unlawful
arrest.
In State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court reiterated the three levels
of Constitutionally permissible encounters between police officers and the public wherein the
Court stated:
"(1) An officer may approach a citizen at anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as the
citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has
an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime;
however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop'; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed."
Id. In order to justify a seizure of Mr. Houston, the arresting officer must have specific,
articulable fact which, when considered with rational inferences, would lead a reasonable
person to conclude that Mr. Houston had or was about to commit a crime. The serious of
inferences that Officer Houston made that were irrational were: (1) that Mr. Houston was not a
reported farrier, even though corroborated by the animal clinic staff, and that (2) the crystal
iodine was intended to be used for the production of methamphetamme. The fact is upon initial
questioning, nothing lead Det. Funk to believe that Mr. Houston was nothing other than reported
- that he was a licensed farrier and that the crystal iodine was used for shoeing horses, his parttime business. R. at 447.
Meanwhile, this case involving Mr. Houston is also very similar in nature and facts to
State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), another case where the defendant prevailed.
In Struhs, a deputy observed a vehicle at a construction site parked without its lights on, just as
Mr. Oliver's on this occasion. The deputy approached and seized Mr. Struhs who was in his
vehicle. This Court ruled that there was no reasonable suspicion to perform a seizure of Mr.
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Struhs. In this case, just as in Struhs, the officer claims to be "concerned." The original
"concern" which was suggested in DEA training is that people falsely holding themselves as
farriers illegally obtain crystal iodine from vet clinics. T-l, at 62. Nothing lead Det. Funk to
believe Mr. Houston was (a) not a farrier and (b) to believe the crystal iodine was not intended
for a legitimate business purpose. Sgt. Jensen admitted that he looked for Houston at the request
of Det. Funk, once he concocted a basis for he stop, in this case an expired registration, Sgt.
Jensen exploited that basis in order to secure Mr. Houston for Det. Funk. Mr. Houston was
subsequently detained and not permitted to leave the scene, while Sgt. Jensen conducted an
alleged inventory search of the vehicle. Once the bottle of iodine was recovered, Mr. Houston
was placed under arrest. T-l, at 67.
These officers exploited the situation violating Mr. Houston's rights. The selfincriminating remarks and the solicited confession were both exploited violating both Mr.
Houston's Fourth and Sixth Amendment rights. Mr. Houston's arrest and the seizure of the
iodine was in violation of the Fourth Amendment violation and the confession of its intent was
violative of Mr. Houston's Sixth Amendment rights to remain silent and or for counsel as beling
exploited and for the agents not clarifying that Mr. Langston did not count for purposes of
Miranda. It is undisputed that he requested Brent Langston's presence concerning incriminating
statements. R. at 446. The duty of officers and Mr. Langston as agents of the government had a
duty to clarify what appeared to be an equivocal request.
The Utah Court of Appeals has already addressed equivocal requests for lawyers in State
v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In that case, the court held that when a
defendant makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for an attorney, questioning with respect to
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the subject matter of the investigation must immediately stop, and any further questioning must
be limited to clarifying the request. If the defendant then makes clear that he or she desires to
have counsel present, further questioning is prohibited. See also, State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965,
969 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In this matter, the seizure of the bottle, Mr. Houston's arrest, and
subsequent interview confession were all exploitive in nature and should have been suppressed.
None of this evidence was freely obtained. It came with a price, his liberty. As a result of the
trial in this matter, Mr. Houston was wrongfully convicted and imprisoned contrary to the
representations suggested by counsel, Brent Langston on December 30, 2002 during the
interview.

POEYTIL
MARGRET TAYLOR RENDERED DEFENDANT INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL PRIOR TO TRIAL LEADING TO SEVERE PREJUDICE AT TRIAL.

"A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and law,
which we review de novo." United States v. Holder, 410 F.3d 651, 654 (10th Cir. 2005).
"Moreover, we review a district court's factual findings based on live testimony presented at the
evidentiary hearing only for clear error." Romero v. Tansy, 46 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995)
(citation omitted). In this matter is quite clear that the representation Defendant received from
Margret Taylor was ineffective.
In this matter, the defendant asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in
the pretrial phase of his criminal proceeding. This ineffective is alleged to have resulted in an
unfair jury trial. Had he received effective assistance of counsel. One, Defendant would not
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have waived his preliminary hearing. Two, Defendant would have had his equivocal request
for counsel and to self-incriminating statements adduced in his December 30, 2002
interrogation suppressed as evidence during the trial. Three, Defendant would have had the
charge limited to one second degree felony, at worse, at the time of trial or he may have pled
guilty to a misdemeanor offense, at best. In the alternative, at trial, the defendant would have
the benefit of reduced offenses or lesser included offenses presented to the jury at the time of
trial. Four, Jennifer McNair would not have been permitted to testify concerning the
toxicology reported prepared by Kevin Smith. (E.g., State v. Workman, 122 P.3d 639 (Utah
2005)). During trial McNair admitted she did not analyze the controlled substance submitted
to the State Crime Lab.
As case law in support of his effective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant directs
this Court's attention to State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376 (Utah 1999). In this case, the
Maestas was granted a new trial on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for the simple
fact that counsel did not ensure a Long instruction was included in that matter, because a
witness's memory is fallible. In this matter, defense counsel is not certain whether a Long
instruction was included at the time of trial. The only instructions he has in the file is the
elements and the "controlled substance precursor" instruction.
Notwithstanding, more prejudicial error occurred in this matter than what occurred in
Maestas. In this matter, as demonstrated in the interrogation transcript, Mr. Houston was
clearly enticed into his alleged confessed criminal conduct. That confession was relied on
heavily at the time of trial. All three investigators, Harrison, Jensen, and Funk all referred to
the confession that "crystal iodine was being traded for cash or meth" to John Paul Fazzio.
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That confession was even referenced in the opening remarks by the prosecutor, Brent Langston
who assisted investigators in obtaining the alleged confession upon his promises for Mr.
Houston coming clean. In this matter the defendant came clean, even after to assertions of his
rights against self-incrimination and for counsel. R. at 446.
Had counsel been effective, this alleged confession would have been suppressed by way
of pre-trial motion and hearing. In stead, his counsel missed he deadline and then withdrew.
Likewise, counsel filed a motion to sever and also withdrew it. R. at 240, 255, 265. Also, it's
plausible that had a preliminary hearing been conduct and evidence obtained, effective trial
counsel might have been successful to present a motion to the court to reduce charges or seek a
lesser included offense instruction at the time of trial or for the suppression of evidence.
Under the doctrine of Ejusdem Generis that and other statutory construction schemes, that as a
licensed farrier defendant did not commit a violation of Section 58-37c-l 1, but rather of
Section 58-37c-19 - which is a misdemeanor offense. Finally, had defendant been afforded
effective assistance of counsel, defendant could have compelled the State to honor it's
perceived grant of prosecutorial immunity, which is clearly outlined above.

POINTIII.
UNDER JOHNSON v. ZERBST. GIDEON v. WAINRIGHT. AND PENSON v. OHIO
THE CONVICTION IN THIS MATTER IS VOID FOR HAVING AN INCOMPLETE
COURT PURSUANT TO THE SIXTH AMENDMENT.
In this matter, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 146
A.L.R. 357 (1938) and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799
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(1963) are controlling. In this matter, the record reflects that Mr. Houston was indigent. That
find was made on January 28, 2005, apparently following Defendant's conviction of thirteen
counts of Precursor violations all second degree felonies. The finding of the court prior to trial
on January 26, 2005 was that the request was untimely claiming that Mr. Houston had ample
opportunity to retain counsel. However, as the record also reflects that he did have counsel for
near two years - Margret Taylor, but for her ineffective assistance of counsel prior to trial, he
would have bee represented by an attorney at the time of trial. The court inappropriate attributed
Ms. Taylor's failures and delay upon Mr. Houston. It bad enough that counsel inappropriately
waived Mr. Houston's right to a preliminary hearing without his consent or knowledge but its
quite another that her personal agenda to legalize drugs actually resulted in additional charges
against him being applied in the State's two amended Informations.
In the Sixth Amendment context, Mr. Houston has been prejudiced in this matter. In
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963), the Supreme Court
established in right to counsel in state criminal proceedings is guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. It is therefore impermissible to try a person for a felony in a state court unless that
person has an attorney or knowingly and intentionally waives the right to an attorney. In this
matter, the defendant raises the issue of afforded counsel. Furthermore, he disputed waiving the
right to counsel. To raise the issue and produce some evidence that he or she was not represented
by counsel and did not knowingly waive counsel" at an earlier proceeding which resulted in a
conviction. Utah recognizes that it is appropriate to presume that the right to counsel has been
observed "unless the defendant affirmatively contends to the contrary." State v. Triptow, 770
P.2d 146, 147-48 (Utah 1989) (citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S. Ct. 258, 19 L. Ed. 2d
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319 (1967), and Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S. Ct. 1585, 64 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1980) (per
curiam)).
In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357
(1938) the Supreme Court stated:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defence." This is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment
deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty. Omitted from
the Constitution as originally adopted, provisions of this and other Amendments were
submitted by the first Congress convened under that Constitution as essential barriers
against arbitrary or unjust deprivation of human rights. The Sixth Amendment stands as
a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will
not 'still be done.' Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S. Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.
Ed. 288. It embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought
before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is
presented by experienced and learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly, and
necessary to the lawyer - - to the untrained layman- - may appear intricate, complex, and
mysterious. Consistently with the wise policy of the Sixth Amendment and other parts of
our fundamental charter, this Court has pointed to '. .. the humane policy of the modern
criminal law . . . . ' which now provides that a defendant' . . . if he be poor,.. . may have
counsel furnished him by the state,. .. not infrequently. . . more able than the attorney
for the state.' Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 308, 50 S. Ct. 253, 261, 74 L. Ed.
854,70A.L.R.263.
The '. . . right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with th rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defence, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceeding against him.' Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68, 69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 63, 64, 77 L. Ed 158, 84 A.L.R. 527. The Sixth
Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance
of counsel.
Two. There is insistence here that petitioner waived this constitutional right. The
District Court did not so find. It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge every
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reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and that we
'do not presume relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The
determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right of counsel must
depend , in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case,
including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 50 S. Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed 854, 70 A.L.R. 263,
decided that an accused may, under certain circumstances, consent to a jury of eleven and
waive the right to trial and verdict by a constitutional jury of twelve men. The question of
waiver was there considered on direct appeal from the conviction and not by collateral
attack on habeas corpus. However, that decision may be helpful in indicating how, and
in that manner, an accused may-before his trial results in final judgment and convictionwaive the right to assistance of counsel. The Patton Case noted approvingly a state court
decision pointing out that the humane policy of modern criminal law had altered
conditions which had existed in the 'days when the accused could not testify in his own
behalf, (and) was not furnished counsel' and which had made it possible to convict a man
when he was 'without money, without counsel, without ability to summon witnesses, and
not permitted to tell his own s t o r y . . . . '
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel invokes, of itself, the
protection of a trial court, in which the accused- whose life and liberty is at stake-is
without counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility
upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent waiver by the accused.
While an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should
be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that
determination to appear upon the record. Three. The District Court, holding petitioner
could not obtain relief by habeas corpus, said: 'It is unfortunate, if petitioners lost there
right to a new trial through their ignorance or negligence, but such misfortune cannot give
this court jurisdiction in a habeas corpus case to review and correct the errors complained
of.'
The purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is to protect an accused
from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights,
and the guaranty would be nullified by a determination that an accused's ignorant failure
to claim his rights removes the protection of the Constitutional. True, habeas corpus
cannot be used as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities-not involving the
question of jurisdiction-occurring during the course of trial; and the 'writ of habeas
corpus cannot be used as a writ of error.' Woolsev v. Best, 299 U.S. 1, 2, 57 S. Ct. 2, 81
L. Ed 3. These principles, however, must be construed and applied so as to preserve-not
destroy-constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty.
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the
assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential
jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or
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liberty. When this right is properly waived , the assistance of counsel is not longer a
necessary element of the court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If the
accused, however, is not represented by counsel and not competently and intelligently
waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdiction bar to a
valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty. A court's
jurisdiction at the hearing of trial may be lost 'in the course of the proceedings' due to
failure to complete the court-as the Sixth Amendment requires-by providing counsel for
an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived this
constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309, 327, 35 S. Ct. 582, 587, 59 L. Ed. 969. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment
is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of
conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned
thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus. Ex Parte Hans Neilsen, Petitioner, 131
U.S. 176, 9 S. Ct. 672, 33 L. Ed. 118. A judge of the United States-to whom a petition
for habeas corpus is addressed-should be alert to examine 'the facts for himself when if
true as alleged they make the trial absolutely void.' Cf. Moore v. Dempsev. 261 U.S. 86,
92, 43 S. Ct. 265, 267, 67 L. Ed. 543; Patton v. United States. 281 U.S. 276, 312, 313, 50
S. Ct. 253, 74 L. Ed. 854, 70 A.L.R. 263.
Id., at 462-468.
The Johnson Court remanded the matter back to the district court to address the question of a
waiver. In this case, the record is clear that there was no waiver. The record is clear that Mr.
Houston was indigent. R. at 347.6 It is also clear that Mr. Houston desired counsel and was
unable to secure one even as late as January 19, 2005, just days before the trial. Judge Bryner
admitted on the record of the trial that he instructed Mr. Houston to submit an affidavit of
indigency so that he could address the question of appointing Mr. Houston counsel. In light of
the instruction, Mr. Houston submitted an affidavit, although defective on, five days later. Given
the history and the facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused, the Court should not have deprived Defendant of counsel
at the time of trial. Even the fact that Mr. Houston failed to correctly fill out the affidavit should

6

The record suggests that the judge found indigency prior to the return of the jury with its'
"guilty verdicts." R. at 379-380.
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have been enough to justify appointment of counsel. The Court in light of Johnson, at 464, failed
to make the proper and complete inquiry to support a waiver claim. The only relevant conduct
for Defendant was the time frame of January 4 to January 26, 2005. Both of Houston's prior
lawyers were permitted to withdraw, and Taylor's was without good cause just because Houston
refused a deal. Just because she disagreed with Houston concerning taking a deal was not a
disqualifying conflict and she should have been required to fulfill her obligations to Houston and
commitments to the court. R. at 270.
Nevertheless, in light of Johnson, at 467-468, what is clear is that the Court failed to
complete a trial on January 26, 2005.7 After depriving Houston of appointed counsel, he
instructed Mr. Houston on how to proceed to trial and th jury was brought in and sworn placing
Mr. Houston in jeopardy.8
The principles of above were reiterated by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88, 109 S. Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988) stated "[A] pervasive
denial of counsel casts such doubt on the fairness of the trial process, that it can never be
considered harmless error. Because the fundamental importance of the assistance of counsel
does not cease as the prosecutorial process moves from the trial to the appellate stage,... the
presumption of prejudice must extend as well to the denial of counsel on appeal."

7

A court's jurisdiction at the hearing of trial may be lost 'in the course of the proceedings'
due to failure to complete the court-as the Sixth Amendment requires-by providing counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional
guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327, 35 S. Ct. 582,
587, 59 L. Ed. 969. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no
longer has jurisdiction to proceed.
8

It is well established that "Jeopardy attaches in a judge-tried case when the first witness is
sworn and the court begins to take evidence." State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1061,1065 (Utah 1983)
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In this matter, on March 24, 2005, the defendant through post trial counsel, D. Bruce
Oliver, filed a motion seeking a new trial. R. at 427. Even after pointing out the errors of prior
counsel and the errors of Houston's exploited interrogation, the Court denied the motion. R. at
522-526. In the last page of the denial of the motion for new trial, the court stated
The defendant asserts prejudicial error by being forced to act as his own attorney at the
time of trial. Specifically, the defendant claims that on January 19, 2005, the court misled
him into believing that counsel would be appointed immediately upon his filing on an
Affidavit of Indigency. The defendant has not provided a transcript, affidavit, or other
evidence to support this assertion. The defendant did not submit the Affidavit of
Indigency to the court until it was faxed to the court on January 24, 2005, at 11:30 p.m.
The court did not see the affidavit until the day of trial - January 26, 2005, at which time
the court found that it was submitted untimely and declined to appoint counsel at that
time.
R. at 526. The only fact no mentioned that this Court may take judicial notice of is that January
19, 2005 was a Thursday and the jury trial was the following Wednesday. As identified on page
4 of the State's response to the motion for new trial, (R. at 515), the defendant was not informed
he was without counsel until January 4, 2005 at a Pretrial conference. Essentially, defendant was
required to work graveyard hours and find an attorney during the daylight hours, when he was to
sleep, in a fifteen day period, while facing seventeen alleged second-degree felony counts. What
attorney that close to trial would even touch him without being appointed or additional time to
prepare?
Mr. Houston was informed he was without counsel on January 4, 2005, just 22 days
before a scheduled two-day felony trial. He was asked to obtain new counsel. On January 19,
2005, Mr. Houston appeared before the court again and informed the court he could not afford
private counsel. Therefore, the court requested that he submit an affidavit declaring his
indigency. T-l, at 344-347. Three business days later, that affidavit was delivered to the court
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but was not looked at until the morning of trial.
It appears that his above described circumstance does not raise to the level of a waiver.
The waiver must be knowing and deliberate. Even the trial court recognized that the defendant
asserts he was misled to believe an attorney would be appointed for trial. As case law reveals,
prejudice such as in this matter is presumed. This Court should determine that a manifest error
has resulted and that this Court erred by not appointing counsel. As directed by the Supreme
Court of the United States, the defendants in state felony proceedings are guaranteed counsel at
the time of trial. Nothing in this record shows that this guarantee here was honored.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Mr. Houston requests this court to vacate the Defendant's
conviction for loss of jurisdiction in the course of the proceedings for not providing a complete
court - as the Sixth Amendment the court cannot deprive the accused of counsel at trial. Also,
the defendant was deprived effective assistance of counsel during his near two year pretrial
proceedings. It was error for the defendant's counsel to be permitted to withdraw two months
before trial without cause particularly since her conduct had prejudiced the defendant and her
reign of representations lasted for nearly two years, resulting in the loss of suppression issues, the
failure to sever prejudicial claims, repeated continuances, the lack of preparation for trial, no
witnesses being called for his defense, and the apparent waiver of a preliminary hearing.
Meanwhile, it is obvious that the arresting officer and agents of the State had zero probable cause
to arrest Mr. Houston and to seize his lawfully purchased crystal iodine. At the time of arrest,
Det. Funk knew from Mr. Houston and the Emery Animal Clinic both that Houston was a farrier
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and that he had a history of purchasing iodine crystals and iodine solution both from the clinic,
and that he had acquired the general reputation as being a farrier according to employees of the
clinic. Then following the arrest, during the interview, the agents and officers exploited Mr.
Houston and his circumstances by forcing an appearing consensual confession, when "but for"
the false arrest and the false representations of leniency by a lawyer made in light of Miranda, the
confession never would have been obtained.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _8th_ day of
February, 2006.

D. BRUCE OLIVER, L.L.C.
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LSEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No.

Judge Bryce K. Bryner

JEFFERY (NMI) HOUSTON
DOB:

031700004

06/29/1968
Defendant.

CA No. 03-0002

The above-named Defendant appeared for Sentencing on March 14,2005, together with his
attorney, D. Bruce Oliver. The State was present and represented by W. Brent Langston, Deputy
Emery County Attorney. The Defendant was previously convicted of 13 counts of CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE PRECURSOR ACT VIOLATION, all Second-Degree Felonies. Court and counsel
previously received and reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report prepared by Adult Probation
and Parole. The Defendant advised the Court that he had no legal reason to state why judgment
should not be pronounced, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now pronounces the
judgment and sentence as follows:
Page 1 of 3
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JUDGMENT
It is the judgment of the Court that the Defendant, Jeffery Houston, is guilty of the offenses
of thirteen (13) separate counts of CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE PRECURSOR ACT
VIOLATION, all Second-Degree Felonies.
SENTENCE
It is the sentence of the Court that Jeffery Houston serve concurrent terms on each count in
the State Prison of the State of Utah of NOT LESS THAN ONE (1) YEAR, NOR MORE THAN
FIFTEEN (15) YEARS, and pay a total fine of $5,000.00, inclusive of surcharge.
It is further ordered that the Defendant be held at the Emery County Detention Center so that
post-conviction motions may be filed. Once motions are filed, a court date may be scheduled by
conference call. If such motions are not filed within the statutory ten days, Defendant is ordered to
be transported to the Utah State Prison.
Defendant shall be given credit for time already served in jail and from this point on until
resolved.
Jeffery Houston is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Emery County.
DATED this / J*

day of March, 2005.
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Approved:

BKEl
Deputy Emery County Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

£&

day of March, 2005, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing JUDGMENT was mailed to:
D BRUCE OLIVER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
180 S 300 W SUITE 210
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-1490
raxed 5-"4-OS

LIEUTENANT BILL DOWNARD
EMERY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
CASTLE DALE UT
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FltED
THE STATE OF UTAH,

VERDICT

M

2 8 2D05

Plaintiff,

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS
VS.
JEFFERY HOUSTON,
Defendant.

Case No.

031700004

Judge BryceK.Bryner

WE, THE JURY, duly impaneled and sworninthe above entitled cause, dofindthe
Defendant Jeffery Houston as follows:
Count l: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty _ £ _
Count 2: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty _ / _
Counts: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty ^ _
Count 4: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty _ J _
Count 5: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty _ X _
Count 6: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty _ X _
Count 7: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty _1_
Count 8: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty _Y_
Count 9: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty _ X
Count 10: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty _X_
Count 11: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty _ X
Count 12: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty _*_

Not Guilty _
Not Guilty _
Not Guilty _
Not Guilty _
Not Guilty.
Not Guilty
Not Guilty _
Not Guilty _
Not Guilty _
Not Guilty _
Not Guilty.
Not Guilty
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Count 13: Controlled Substance Precursor Act Violation: Guilty
DATED this <£tf

)(_

Not Guilty

day of January, 2005.

{{J^isn. Q\LAXH
Foreperson
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Defendant's Name

Defendant's Address

Citv, Sated: Zip

Telephone

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SPETC

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF. UTAH.
Flainm%

AEFTDAVTT OF INDIGENCY

vs.

Case No. Q\/lOi>ao4

£<.

Judge &&ytd£g
Defendant

Defendant provides the following information required by Utah Code Section 77-32-1.1:
DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL INFORMATION

Fill out the following table completely.
Eflspbyer*!
Maine* A4ctas

Moodily Grata b a m e

MotalhIyN«tIocorx

Alimony received
OuM Support received
faooaefetfwpasUZmofJbsiromiiyoth^
«apJoytt2^r^ps>ioeos;ua^^
inheritance

§£-

#

Inco«iw&omgov*mmai2rttrtd^
veterans 0DOtduc»0nii benefits,, housingfood,or other living allowinces ptid to members of Ae military, clerjv,
and often.
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If Defendant is currently not employed:

^

Date & state of last employment

-txJ

Salary/wages per month when last employed

Amounts in cnh or in «iy back, acsooflCt bdading avtnp aad cbccfciflj

*^></*r

.Apouacio«^toDdfeadiqtia^^

/tV<*^T

List of home, land or other real proper? and veMcIes or ottxe^
its locarionaad its approximate value. Include any teal or personal propenywt^ Defendant has t r a c ^
party since ihe date of the offense alleged in the infonnadon.

r^:

J Ptopoy

AJLMJ^-

Vtiw

I

— — — — •

.

^

,

Llfc^fca^—i—i—~^m++m

m

n

i

i

m ii ii

W

^

|

a

^

—

—

^

1—MB-^—••«•[^^^^^^WI«M*B«BB«»"""i^^"™^^^^™""^^^^N

• M M i ^ ^ ^ i H ^ i i ^ a i

J

List ofDefendant's debts.
To whom owed

To whom owed

Amount

k

Amount

.«r*LJ'/jto/*«"'4Kt»
&,L d,m,KJaMa"4ir*x>^

&er/KasJKt&u
K/Uy-/«x<
List ofDefendant's monthly expenses.
Amount
Fooa

4ffl*

Gas

Clothing:

Water

Transportation

Sewer

Mbrtgagc/rcnt
Electricity

j^V^C^^

Amount

AttOQ&t

Other Gi«)

ZL&

Car Payments

^2

**

lftj/</&ftjjytfy*

Medical Payments

2
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DEFENDANT'S DEPENDENTS.

A**

Reiatioiuiup

Name

Age

Rektkxubtp

JZL
/£>

STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF

)

^jy]f/€iy

)« "3T3T- 5^?

4

)

Being sworn, I state that L / ^ / v ^ g ^ / T ^ K S * r ^ . am the Defendant;
that I have read this Affidavit and &e sta^ments in It are true and correct to the best of
my knowledge; and_^aj.dn^iojnT^o_YertyJLam unable to-hear-the-cxpen»es-of-h«ng-ag
attorney to defend myself in this proceeding.

T75S

ofDefendant)

Subscribed and sworn before me on.

/-£S-t/i

^i<:

Q}ARYPUMJC
y Commission Exp:
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ORDER ON AFFIDAVIT OF ESDIGENCY
(To befilledout by the judge)
THE COURT HEREBY incorporates the fects set out in the Defendant's Affidavit of
Indigency, with any modifications indicated verbally on the court record or written below; and
finds as follows:

z

Defendant is indigent
Defendant is not indigent.
Modifications, if any:

z

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
Under Utah Code Titfe 77, Chapter 32,.
is appointed to represent Defendant in the above referenced case.
Under Utah Code Title 77, Chapter 32, Defendant is not entitled to appointed
defense counsel in the above referenced case.

DATED this <*-"£* day of.

BY THE COURT:

6s?^

*£3

COURT JUDGE
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1

|| showing 1/24/2005, at 23:27, which would mean about, ah

2

||

MR. HOUSTON:

3

II

THE COURT:

4

MR. HOUSTON:

5

THE COURT:

10:30.

—

That would be about 11:30.

11:30 at night.
Okay.
So you would have faxed it on the

6

24th at 11:30 at night.

I was notified by the clerk,

7

yesterday afternoon, that this had, ah -- had arrived.

8

were requesting counsel.

You

Ifm going to make a finding that your filing of this

9
10

document at that late hour is untimely, so I!m not even going

11

to consider it.

12

to the court time to appoint counsel and, ah, have counsel on

13

board, ah, prior to the time that the trial began.

14

the affidavit that you filed, even though it f s not completed

15

and even though under that you otherwise may have qualified

16

for an attorney, is untimely.

17

before the trial.

18

II

The reason being is that that was not given

So the --

Filed essentially one day

The Court is also going to make certain other

19

findings here.

20

when the information was filed which charged the defendant

21

with the violation of the Controlled Substance Precursor Act

22

violation.

23

This case began on January the 6th of 2003,

On February the 7th of 2003, Attorney Margaret

24

Taylor, of Helper, Utah, entered an appearance on behalf of

25

the defendant.

And on February the 4th, the preliminary

OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT
PAGE

hearing had been scheduled for April the 4th of 2003.
for the defendant then filed a motion to dismiss.
denied.

Counsel

That was

And then numerous continuances were requested, with

regard to the preliminary hearing.

And finally, on December

the 2nd of 2003, the defendant waived preliminary hearing and
the trial was scheduled for April 26th of 2004.
MR. HOUSTON:
right.

I never did.

(Inaudible) —

Your Honor, ah, I never waived my

My attorney may have, but

—

not here.

THE COURT:

Well, I!m just making findings, based on

the record that I have here, and I!ll let you respond in a
moment.
On December the 2nd of 2003, that's the date that
the defendant waived preliminary hearing and the trial was
scheduled for April 26th of 2004.

And on April 6th of 2003

the defendant filed a motion to suppress.

The trial was

vacated and a hearing on the motion to suppress was set for
April 26th.
MR. LANGSTON:

Could I have that date again?

December 7th, what?
THE COURT:

I didn!t say December the 7th.

Let T s back up.

On December the 2nd of 2003, the

record shows that you waived your preliminary hearing and the
trial was scheduled for April 26th of 2004.
MR. LANGSTON:

Then on

—

Your Honor, with respect to that, my
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1

records indicate that he waived preliminary on June 3rd of

2

2003.

3

December, but I think he originally waived that in —

4

show in June.

5

I don't know if that was just reiterated again in

THE COURT:

6

Okay.

my notes

Well, in regards to the date,

it's insignificant, as far as what we're discussing here.

7

MR. LANGSTON:

8

THE COURT:

9

reviewing some —

Okay.

What I'm doing is reviewing the —

I'm

the record to show that the defendant,

10

throughout these proceedings, has been represented by counsel

11

at all times.

12

defendant filed a motion to suppress, and the trial was

13

vacated and the hearing on the motion to suppress was

14

scheduled for April 26th.

15

continue that date, and then finally the motion to suppress

16

was reset for July 27th of 2004.

17

defendant's request.

18

II

And then on April the 6th of 2004, the

Several motions were filed to

All of these at the

Eventually the trial was set for October the 6th of

19

2004.

20

and the trial had to be cancelled because of the Court having

21

a kidney stone on that date.

22

for November the 18th of 2004, remembering at all times that

23

the defendant has employed by counsel, Mz. Margaret Taylor.

24

And then the day before the trial, on November the 17th of

25

And on the date of the trial, the Court became ill, ah,

The trial was then rescheduled

|| <L
2004,
counsel -- defense counsel, as well as counsel of the
U U*:

II
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contacted the Court and stated that they had reached

a plea agreement; and that was by telephone.

And on that

basis the Court then cancelled the jury, but ordered that

—

that the defendant, as well as counsel, appear on the
following day, which was the, ah, date of the trial on the
18th of November, for the purpose of having the defendant
enter his plea.

And then on November 18th, ah, both counsel

and the defendant appeared, and at that time the defendant
refused to enter a plea.
At that point there was a dispute between counsel
and, ah, Mr. —

that is a dispute between defense counsel and

the defendant.

And at that time defense counsel made a motion

to withdraw, which the Court granted.

At that time the Court

then rescheduled the trial for January 26th of 2005.

That

then gave the defendant more than two months within which to
obtain counsel.

And the Court ordered the defendant to come

back to court on December the 7th with his new counsel to
confirm that he had, in fact, employed counsel.
On December the 7th, the defendant appeared and
stated that he had employed Mr. Bruce Oliver.

The Court then

scheduled a pretrial for January the 4th of 2005.

Then, in

the mean time, Mr. Oliver withdrew as defense counsel on
December 16th of 2004, citing as reasons that he was not able
to keep in contact and could not communicate or reach his
~c2ierTE~r~
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1

At the pretrial, on January the 4th, 2005, the Court

2

questioned the defendant, as to his hiring counsel.

The

3

Court, at that time, found that the defendant was employed

4

full-time and suggested on the record that the defendant did

5

not qualify for a Public Defender.

6

January 13th of 2005, the Court once again ordered the

7

defendant to appear on January the 19th of 2 005 to review his

8

counsel status.

9

the Court advised the defendant that he could file an

But then again, on

On January 19th the defendant appeared and

10

affidavit of indigency, but that it would have to be done

11

immediately.

12

defendant filed an affidavit.

13

was not complete.

14

day —

15

And then, one day before the trial, the
But once again, the affidavit

And the Court finds that finding it one

filing it one day before trial is untimely.
So on that basis then the Court finds that the

16

defendant has had ample time to employ counsel, ah, that he

17

had ample opportunity to submit an affidavit, ah, requesting

18

that counsel be appointed, if he could not appoint counsel,

19

and the Court just has no other option but to go ahead with

20

the trial —

21

count —

All right.

or with the trial at this time.
That takes care of the issue of counsel.

22

The next thing I need to address is, ah, as I have opened the

23

file this morning, I found that a Second Amended Information

24

had been filed.

25

II

Letfs see.

Bailiff, would you hand the defendant a
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